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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between entry strategy and performance has been widely studied. 
Most of these studies were conducted or modelled in the context of free-competition 
industries. Little research has been conducted to study new entrant strategies in industries 
which were formerly natural monopolies industries. For this reason, this study is intended 
to compare and examine the relationship between new entrants strategy and performance 
in the newly liberalised industries, particularly in the UK telecommunications service 
during the period 1991-1997. 
The study found that entry into newly liberalised industry has not automatically 
resulted in the success of new entrants. In particular, the study has shown that all new 
entrants' losses were severe in the first three years of entry. AJI new entrants had a 
negative ROI, ROS, RONA, and Cash Flow. The new entrants also had a very small 
market share. Nevertheless, a half of the sample performed relatively better than another 
half of sample. Among the better performers, three were an entry by diversifying 
companies (Cable-TV Companies) and one was an entry by a newly created company. 
A diversifying company has benefited from its ability to capitalise existing 
customer base, skills and resources, and achieve economies of scale in network 
investment, operation and maintenance, and advertising and marketing. A newly created-
innovative entrant has benefited from its proprietary of technological (i.e. fixed radio 
access) advantage to avoid a high level of sunk cost, less investment per new subscriber, 
and faster network deployment. A better performer has also achieved a greater strategic 
flexibility as result of lower invested slack resources (i.e. capital expenditure, working 
capital, and marketing and administration costs) and higher generated slack resources (i.e. 
cash flow and ratio of current asset/current liabilities). 
The results of the study support the thought that type of entrants, magnitude of 
investments - generated slack and invested slack resources-, and competitive positioning 
are likely to have a significant relationship with the performance of new entrants, while 
timing of entry is only considered to be a contingent determinant of entry success. The 
results also suggest that pioneering advantage and competitive reaction to entry of the 
incumbents still became potential barriers to entry. 
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competitive background. The Entry Strategy Performance model provides a useful 
framework to analyse the relationship between entry strategy and performance of new 
entrants. 
The data and information regarding the UK telecommunications service are 
collected from secondary data available in the public domain. These are company reports, 
industry and market survey reports, official statistic and specific journals in the 
telecommunications industry during the period 1991-1997. The data is then examined and 
analysed using the above frameworks and quantitative methods used in business and social 
science. 
The report is organised into six part. The first part concerns with general 
introduction. The second part reviews the literature on entry strategy and performance. 
This particularly examines the framework of entry strategy and performance measurement. 
The third part discusses and examines the evolution of the UK telecommunications service 
industry. The opportunities and challenges are explored as a result of liberalisation, 
technological development and convergence, and market size and growth of the UK 
telecommunications service industry. 
The findings are presented in Part Four. It includes discussion of the type of new 
entrants, entry strategy, and performance of each new entrant. Part Five concerns the 
discussion and analysis of new entrants' strategy and performance. And finally, a 
conclusion presents lesson from the previous discussions. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAI\IE\VORK 
The probability of successful entry is likely to be determined by type of entrant, 
timing of entry, new entrant strategy and positioning, the behaviour of the incumbent, the 
effect of demand uncertainty. There is a great risk of failure that may arise when the 
entrant is introducing a product with new and untested attributes. The behaviour of the 
incumbent is determined by the incentives that they face and the product-market 
characteristics of the industry - the number and resources of the established competitors, 
the physical nature of the market, and the legal and informational environment of the 
industry. 
2.1 Type of Entrant 
There are numerous distinct types of entrant. Therefore, entry can be defined in a 
variety of ways. It is might be useful to define entry in term of new source of supply, 
regardless whether this involves new sources of production, entry by foreign producers 
through import, or entry by acquisition of an old-established firm. 
Several studies have noted the considerable heterogeneity that exists in the 
characteristics of the companies that enter the market (Geroski and Schwalbach, 1991 ). At 
least five distinction have been found to be important: (a) entry by newly created company 
or de novo company~ (b) entry by an existing company that develop and launch a new 
product in the market~ (c) entry by an existing company that diversify its business~ (d) 
entry by an existing company that alters the product mix in an existing market~ ( e) entry by 
a foreign-owned company in one of the above ways as opposed to a domestic company. 
From the point of view of survivability, Geroski (1991) categorised two distinct types of 
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Mitchell ( 1991) found that the effects of being early or late varied with the type of 
entrants studied. De novo entrants face a market share-survival trade off. When a new 
market emerges, a newcomer to the industry will be more likely to gain market share if it 
enters early, but will be more likely to survive if it enters late. An established firm, which 
diversifies its business to a new market, will perform better if it waits while newcomers 
launch the product or service into the new market. 
The conflicting evidence reported above suggest that competitive advantage is not 
automatically endowed by being an early entrant. There are other important detenninants 
and a broader context of entry strategy to be consider. Green et al ( 1995 ), as shown in 
Figure- I, have proposed four core managerial decision components as detenninants of 
entry strategy - timing of entry, magnitude of investment and area of competitive 
emphasis, and competitive positioning - and two moderating variables - product-market 
characteristics, and source of advantage - in an integrative framework of entry strategy -
performance. This framework allows us to integrate the various issues associated with the 
entry strategy - performance relationship, thereby providing a mechanism for conducting 
research and analysis of the performance of new entrants. 
Product-Market 
Characteristics 
. cooccntration 
• growth rate 
• market potential 
• entry barricn 
• number of 
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Figure-1: Entry Strategy Performance Model (adapted from Green et al, 1995) 
The first determinant, timing of entry, concerns the decision of when _to enter a 
new or existing market, which affects the competitive positioning of the product/ service 
at entry, because the mix of competitor and customer expectations differs. As discussed 
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product line strategy), (b) business unit level strategy ( distribution strategy and output or 
capacity signalling), and ( c) corporate level strategy ( multi market pre-emption and 
stakeholders relationship) (Gruca and Sudharshan, 1995). Which appropriate subset of 
variables taken for entry deterrence depends upon the incumbent' s perception that new 
entrants depress the incumbent's profitability and the levels of company resources to be 
dedicated for its competitive entry reaction. 
A quickly reaction by incumbents blunts the potential new entrant advantage. This 
reaction is likely to limit the new entrant's ability to reshape preference, any association 
between the new entrants and a revised ideal point, and lowers the likelihood of consumer 
trial for a new product or service attractiveness (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989). 
The second dimension of competitive reaction, strategic and marketing mix 
employed, are commonly an increase in advertising/sales force/distribution channel 
expenditure, product innovation and quality, and price decrease (Cubbin and Domberger, 
l 988~ Gatignon et. al, 1997). A study by Gatignon et al, ( 1997) shows that the first two 
strategies were particularly associated with the success of reaction strategy to new 
product or service, while the third strategy was not positively related to the success of 
reaction. It may very well be that lowering price is the default option when an incumbent 
is unable to cope with the innovativeness of the new product or service. 
The third dimension of competitive reaction, breadth of reaction, is shown to be 
related negatively to the success of the competitive reaction. Gatignon et al ( 1997) found 
that companies which react on multiple dimensions of strategic and marketing mix report 
less success. 
2.4 Measuring Strategic Performance 
Measuring and comparing strategic performance is unlikely to provide a single 
comprehensive result. There is no commonly accepted list of performance variables or 
methods by which business strategies should be evaluated. However, there are some 
common performance variables that have been used in studies of examining corporate or 
business strategies, and among these are summarised in Table 1. 
The majority of studies used financial (profitability) performance measures. Of 
these, the most commonly used were ROE and/ or ROI, ROA and/ or RONA, ROCE, 
and ROS. If the primary interest in measuring financial performance is to determine the 
return to shareholder and shareholder investment, ROE attempts to provide returns to the 
equity capital in the firm. ROE is typically higher than ROI when the company utilises 
amount of debt in its financial structure. ROE equals ROI for an all-equity firm. 
Return on net assets (RONA) is a slightly more sophisticated measure that 
attempts to correct for the fact that many of the firm's current assets and current liabilities 
are spontaneous. They are automatically created as a result of the operation of the 
business. The capital base is therefore fixed assets plus net working capital. RONA has 
grown more popular for financial measurement as more companies have focused on their 
net investment position in current assets and liabilities (Eiteman et al., 1997). 
The financial performance, which is rooted in financial accounting, has been 
criticised for the following reasons: scope for accounting manipulation, under-valuation of 
assets, distortions due to depreciation policies, inventory valuation, and treatment of 
c~rtain revenue and expenditure items, different methods of consolidating accounts, and 
differences due to lack of standardisation in international accounting conventions (Brown 
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Oktemgil, l 998~ Cakravarthy, l 986~ Hambrick and D' Aveni, 1988). These measures are 
generated slack and invested slack as shown in Table 2. Generated slack is a measure 
represent available resources for developing strategy option for future flexibility, while 
invested slack is a measure deploying resources which may reduce the opportunity to 
develop strategy option for future flexibility. 
Table 2: Slack Resources Measures 
Generated Sl.ack 
Cash flow/investment 
Debt / Equity 
EBIT I Interest cover 
Market / Book value 
Current asset/ current 
liabilities 
Sales per employee 
Invested Sl.ack 
Ability to generate internal capital for future investment. The higher the 
ratio the higher the available resources for future flexibilitv 
Ability to raise loan capital for future investment. The lower the ratio 
the higher the potential to generate loan capital for future flexibilitv 
Ability to take a risk and to raise additional debt. The higher the ratio 
the higher the potential to raise resources for future flexibilitv 
Ability to raise additional equity capital. The higher the ratio the higher 
the potential to raise additional share capital for future flexibilitv 
Ability to generate liquid resources in excess of short term obligations. 
The higher the ratio the higher the liquid resources for future flexibilitv 
Ability to attain surplus revenue per employee. The higher the ratio the 
higher the resources for future flexibilitv 
Working Capital/ Sales Slack invested in working capital. However, the lower the ratio the 
higher the available resources for developing future strategy option 
Sales/ total assets Slack invested in fixed and current assets. However, the higher the 
ratio the higher the available resources for developing future strategy 
o tion 
Administration cost / Slack invested in salaries, overhead expenses and various 
sales administrative expenses. However, the lower the ratio the higher the 
available resources for developing future strategy 
R & D /sales Slack invested in R & D ex-penditure. However, the lower the higher 
available resources for developing future strategv 
As financial superiority is only one element of a company's performance, whose 
benefits are focused solely on the welfare of the investor (shareholders), others suggest 
that a truly successful measure of firm performance must satisfy a range of stakeholder 
expectations (Brown and Laverick, l 994~ Clarkson, 1995). This measure should not only 
include financial measures, but it should also include operational measure such as 
customer satisfaction (i.e. quality of product, capacity to innovate, quality of marketing), 
use of information technology plus innovation and improvement of the firm's activities, 
employee (i.e. ability to attract, develop, and retain talent) and community (environmental 
responsibility). Despite the subjective nature of this measure, it provides a dynamic insight 
into the esteem attracted by each firm. Furthermore, not only does it highlight successful 
companies but it also provides a method of identifying problem companies. 
III. EVOLUTION AND l\1ARKET GRO\VTH OF THE UK 
TELECOl\fMUNICATIONS SERVICE INDUSTRY 
Two factors have been considered as drivers of the evolution in 
telecommunications service industry: government regulation (liberalisation), and 
technology development Historicaliy, telecommunication services have typically been 
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From the white paper features, it is clear that regulation in the UK 
telecommunications industry is largely the regulation of BT. Because of its size and 
dominance, it is generally considered to be the only operator which can indulge in anti-
competitive behaviour. Therefore, the UK regulator Office of Telecommunications (Oftel) 
is concerned two key issues - i11terco1111ection and number portability - to prevent anti-
competitive behaviour from the incumbent and further liberalise the telecommunications 
industry. 
The aims and objectives of the regulator concerning interconnection ( access 
pricing) include allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, promotion of competition, 
fairness and social obligations. Interconnection is very important in a multi-vendor 
environment, because the telecom system must function as a single system. Users desire 
end-to-end services within an apparently seamless communication network. They want 
connectedness and connectability. The users do not usually care who owns what facilities 
in the overall system, or how the communication links are established. 
Interconnection or access pricing is defined as gaining and giving access to and 
from alternative service providers to bottleneck assets or services derived from them on a 
non-discriminatory basis, at a fair price under set service quality and inter-operability 
standards (Armstrong and Doyle, 1995). Interconnection among complementary service 
providers in different geographical areas, such as between a local exchange carrier and a 
long distance carrier, is unlikely to be a major problem because it is in every provider's 
interests to resolve any problem as quickly as possible. However, interconnection among 
competing telecom operators in the same area may raise a problem, because the 
interconnecting parties are typically of two different types. One is the incumbent, who 
used to be a monopoly service provider and who owns a complete infrastructure. The 
other is the competitive entrant, who wishes to provide service in competition with the 
incumbent but is forced to use parts of the incumbent's infrastructure, the local loops, 
because constructing a complete infrastructure is relatively expensive. 
A transaction of interconnection may be arranged to provide an optimal balance of 
benefits to the two or more partners as well as to serve the interest of the general public. 
However, it is difficult to meet the interconnection agreement among the parties because 
of their different interests. The incumbent may argue that such interconnection is 
asymmetrical because the new entrant has far more to gain than the incumbent. Therefore 
the incumbent may refuse to interconnect at all, or to charge such a high price that the 
entrant cannot successfully compete. On the other hand, the entrant wishes to obtain 
interconnection for free, or at least for less than the cost of building and maintaining its 
own local loops. 
In such a situation, the role of government as telecommunications regulator is very 
significant. The problem facing any regulator is at what price interconnection should be 
charged. Obviously a prohibitively high cost will result in the new entrant failing to 
compete with the incumbent. Conversely, an unrealistically low cost for access will result 
in the new entrants not paying the true cost for interconnection to the incumbent's 
network, and will leave virtually no incentive for the new entrant to invest funds in 
building their own network infrastructure. In an ideal environment, interconnection would 
be priced at a cost rate. This could enable market forces to determine the success of both 
the new entrant and the incumbent. The new entrant would attract customers if it was to 
be more efficient than the incumbent, in terms of prices charged to the consumer. In 
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radio-based technolo,gy and fibre optics. Technology development has not only made the 
telecommunication industry more susceptible to competition and further blurring the 
distinction within telecommunication industry (fixed and mobile service), but has also 
facilitated the convergence of telecommunications, broadcast (video), and computing (IT). 
Radio based technologies are rapidly increasing in quality and capacity, and 
decreasing the cost of wireless telecommunication service. The combination of these three 
factors make radio-based telecommunication network much more of a competitive threat 
to the traditional copper-wire (fixed-lines) based telecommunication network. Radio 
(wireless) technology has gone through a series of advances since it was first introduced 
(see Figure 2). 
----~:~,.._ 
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Figure-2: E,·olution of Wireless Technology (adapted from Garg and Sneed, 1996) 
The advances in wireless technology are currently most evident in the explosion of 
cellular telecommunication usage that has occurred over the past ten years. In 1994 there 
were more new cellular telephone lines activated than fixed lines. Despite its success, and 
the emerging indication that cellular might compete with fixed line, the radio-based 
technology is still facing a problem with capacity (radio-spectrum) limitation. Further 
development of digital signalling and the increase in the spectrum available for mobile 
communications will eliminate the capacity constraint. As a result, the wireless 
technologies will become more competitive with fixed-line service. 
Another access technology now available is fibre optics. Fibre optics have 
dramatically changed the nature of competition in fixed line telecommunications. Fibre 
optic networks are the most pervasive and important of all the alternative mode of access 
in telecommunications networks. These networks have been developed to provide 
interconnection of large local area networks, one way data transport, and voice-data 
services access to inter-exchange carriers. Because fibre is so much more efficient than 
microwave technology, the cost of transmission of calls is much less sensitive to distance 
than it was at the time privatisation began. Because of the negligible cost differences, it is 
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Figure-3: Connrgence of Telecommunication, Media and IT (adapted from 
Squires and Analysys Ltd, 1997) 
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology sectors are seeking 
cross-product and cross-platform developments. Examples of new products and service 
being delivered include home banking and home shopping over Internet, voice over 
Internet, E-mail, data and World Wide Web access over mobile phone networks, and the 
use of wireless link to homes and business to connect them to the fixed 
telecommunications networks. 
3.3 Market Size and Growth 
The UK telecommunications service industry can be divided into two broad 
market: fixed and mobile telecommunications service. Liberalisation has driven 
competition in both market. However, different phase of liberalisation between fixed and 
mobile telecommunications has resulted in different growth pattern as shown in Table 5. 
In term of revenues generated, fixed telecommunications market has grew 
relatively stable during the period 1992 - 1997. while mobile telecommunications market 
increasing more than 200 %. The pace of change of mobile telecommunications is now to 
slow although growth rates continue to be well above that for fixed telecommunications. 
In term of volume of call generated, fixed telecommunications market has changed 
at 41 % during the periods of 1992 - 1997. while mobile telecommunication market has 
change more than 300 % during the periods of 1992 - 1997. 
Different growth pattern was not only between fixed and mobile 
telecommunications market, but also between revenues and number of calls generated in 
the industry. As shown in Table 6, this was an evidence that competition has driven calls 
price fallen significantly during the periods 1992 - 1997. 
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Cable licences, Mobile Communications licence and International Simple Resale (ISR) 
licence. The number of licences granted by the UK Government since 1991 are shown in 
Table 7 as follows: 
Table 7: Number of Telecommunication Licences Granted in the UK 1991 - 1997 
(summarised from Oftel. 1998) 
PTO 36 
Cable" O 
Mobile Comm. 28 
ISR 0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
8 
2 
0 
l 
7 
9 
2 
3 
6 
10 
0 
22 
3 
9 
0 
22 
13 
8 
0 
52 
Based on the operating and commercialisation of the licences in the marketplace. 
the new entrants in the UK telecommunications service industry can be categorised into 
five generic grouping based on the criteria of geographic coverage and target customers 
size. These groups are: competitive long-distance providers, regional operators (i.e. 
franchise area for cable-TV operators), resale operators· (national and international), city-
based operators, and cellular (mobile communications) operators. 
4.1 New Entrants' Entry Strategy 
This Part will present entry strategies of the new entrants in the UK 
telecommunications service industry. Due to the limitation of data availability in the public 
domain for new entrants, the study will not cover all new entrants which have been 
granted a licence as in Table 7. The study is limited for only 8 companies. In order to fully 
represent the above five categories of licences, the decision to select companies to be 
included in this study considers year of entry, type of entrants, market coverage and data 
availability. 
Four core management decision on entry strategy and source of advantage for 8 
new entrants under this study are as follows: 
Source Advantage Most of the new entrants source of advantage is from 
advanced technological development of access network (fibre optics and fixed radio 
access technology). However, each new entrant has capitalised in difference ways. The 
new entrants sources of advantage in detail are as follows: 
6 /ncumbencs m duopoZv UK telecommunicatwn market: Brmsh Telecom 1BTJ and Cable&: Wireless tCll'CI and Kmgston l.,pon Hull City 
Council 1Kmgston Communication Hull) to prov,de exclusively telecommunicatwn service m Kmgston. Hull 
1 Only accounced for new 1,cences to prov,de and interconnect telecommunicat1ons ser.·1ce. 
8 Jncumbent of analogue cellular communication (Vodafone&: Ce/Inell "'(th subsequently have also been granted to offer d1g1tal cellular 
communications based on GSA! technology 
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Table 10: New Entrants' Magnitude of Jnyestments as a Percentage of Turnonr 
Property, Plant & Equipment 
(PPE) 
• COLT Telecommunication Pie 11,984 492.2 221.1 109.5 138.0 
• Energis Pie 5,392.7 143.5 63.9 n/a Q n/a 
• General Cable Pie 675.5 705.6 906.3 887.5 817.1 
• Tekwest Communications Pie 875.5 772.4 862.4 538.4 469.0 
• Atlantic Telecom Pie 90.8 201.3 n/a n/a n/a 
• lonicaPle 621.0 659.l 706.3 n/a n/a 
• World Telecom Pie 149.6 18.3 10.0 40.5 n/a 
• Orange Pie 190.9 310.9 231.5 106.7 99.3 
Working Capital 
• COLT Telecommunication Pie -4,500 -37.2 1.4 432.2 307.8 
• Energis Pie -3,350.8 -437.4 16.4 n/a n/a 
• General Cable Pie 70.6 157.8 43.0 33.7 211.7 
• Tekwest Communications Pie -43.6 288.8 268.3 -19.9 -26.0 
• Atlanlic Telecom Pie 50.2 32.9 n/a n/a n/a 
• lonica Pie 450.8 1,202.9 793.8 n/a n/a 
• World Telecom Pie -98.5 -37.9 -21.7 16.5 n/a 
• Orange Pie -41.8 12.4 -27.8 -19.3 -12.7 
Administration Cost 
• COLT Telecommunication Pie 5.206.3 114.5 74.1 39.3 41.4 
• Energis Pie 631.6 75.6 32.4 n/a n/a 
• General Cable Pie 115.7 84.2 68.9 57.5 59.4 ~: 
Telewest Comnuurications Pie 80.6 83.9 72.7 57.6 50.0 ~ • 
• Atlantic Telecom Pie 33.0 40.5 n/a n/a n/a 
• /onica Pie 79.26 91.9 85.8 n/a n/a 
• World Telecom Pie 340.5 74.8 53.7 59.9 n/a 
• Orange Pie 47.2 64.9 46.2 34.3 25.4 
Sales & Marketing11 
• COLT Telecommunication Pie 5,206.2 92.3 53.1 29.1 37.0 
• Energis Pie 495.1 55.4 18.5 n/a n/a 
• General Cable Pie 79. I 55.8 44.4 40.8 42.9 
• Tekwest Communications Pie 46.8 55.3 50.3 39.9 34.8 
• Atlantic Telecom Pie 20.1 21.1 n/a n/a n/a 
• /onica Pie 28.5 29.9 68.1 n/a n/a 
• World Telecom Pie 258.0 53.5 36.0 40.6 n/a 
• Orange Pie 25.2 40.3 35.0 19.1 14.8 
Ad\·ertising11 
• COLT Telecommunication Pie 93.75 0.0 0.32 0.03 0.01 
• Energis Pie 3,150.912 5.2 2.2 n/a n/a 
• General Cable Pie 0 0 0. I 0 0 
• Tekwest Comm1Utications Plc 0.0 0.41 0.02 1.40 2.50 
• Atlantic Telecom Pie 2.5 7.5 n/a n/a n/a 
• /onicaPlc 0 2.5 7.5 n/a n/a 
• World Telecom Pie 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.27 n/a 
• Orange Pie 0.69 0.81 0.53 0.28 0.24 
9 n1a means that the number of year of entry leu than that year of entry 
I 10 Sales and Marketing spend 18 calculated by deducting wages&: salaries for non-marketing&: sales staff, general adminwration costs such as auditor remuneration, non-audit fees. staff pension, and others administrat1011 expe11ses to the total admin,strat,o,i cost. I 11 Data of advertising spe11d for all compames under this study 1s 1ake11 from ACN1else11-MEAL reports. 
I~ this ra110 mc!udc advert1s111g spend for year before the compa11y lau11chcd 11s 11ar,011al service ! I m Agua F. ABI>ILLAH - Birmingham Bualneu School t: 
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4.2 New Entrants Performance 
As already discussed in the literature review, to measure the degree of entry 
success attained by new entrants two dimensions of performance are commonly used: 
financial (profitability) and market share. In this study, four financial performance 
measures: Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Sales (ROS), Cash Flow Investment, 
and Gross Margin Sales and two market performance measures: market share, and 
market share-growth are used in measuring the degree of entry success. 
4.2.1 Financial Performance 
Financial measure of the new entrants in the UK telecommunications service under 
this study for first five years of entry are shown in the following tables. From table 12, we 
can see that new entrant's losses are severe through the first five years of entry. The most 
negative accounting ROI was -604.0 %, while the most positive was 212.9 %. Only one 
company (General Cable)· achieved a positive net income in its fourth year of entry. 
However, in general, there was an indication which shows a favourable improvement of 
new entrant's performance through the first five years of entry. 
Table 12: New Entrants' Pre-tax Return of Investment (RO Ou 
COLT Telecomnumications Pie. -77.0 -16.2 -15.2 -4.l 
Energis Pl.c. -58.2 -65.1 -14.7 n/a n/a 
General Cable Pie. -10.5 -4.7 -1.5 -0.2 0.4 
Telewest Communications Pie. -8.4 -6.4 -5.1 -8.6 -7.4 
lonica Pie. -5.9 -6.2 -5.3 n/a n/a 
Atlantic Telecom Pie. -5.9 -6.2 n/a n/a n/a 
World Telecom Pie. 14 -604.0 212.9 36.4 -57.4 n/a 
Orange Pie. -19.2 -20.4 -22.0 -26.5 -16.5 
Table 13: New Entrants' Pre-tax Return on Sales (ROS)15 
COLT Telecommunications Pie. -5.515 -93.3 -54.9 -25.5 -25.0 
Energis Pie. - 1.145.4 - 169.6 -55.5 n/a n/a 
General Cable Pie. -78.7 -40.7 -14.7 -1.7 .u 
Telewest Communications Pie. -70.l -67.7 -57.7 -44.4 -32.8 
lonicaPlc. -736.6 -I.568.4 -772.3 n/a n/a 
Atlantic Telecom Pie. -6.4 -27.7 n/a n/a n/a 
World Telecom Pie. -308.9 -41.7 -4.2 -32.6 n/a 
Orange Pie. -36.6 -63.4 -51.0 -28.3 -164 
13 Net pre-tax income.'average investment. Income i.J calculated after deduction of cost of sales & operating expenses but prior to interest 
charges and tax (EBITJ. Investment 1s calculated as working capital plus fixed capital tvalue at net book value) 
14 World Telecom 's positive ROI was not a resultfromposltn•e profit but it was a result from negative 1defic1/) in asset held b_v the company 
in that part,cu/ar year. 
IS Net income define us in note J 3 as a percentage of sales /turnover) 
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Gross margin/sales, as shown in Table 16, was the only measure showing the most 
favourable financial performance. Most of the new entrant has had a positive gross 
margin/sales in the first the year of entry, except Colt Telecommunications at the second 
year of entry and Energis which had a negative gross margin/sales through the three years 
of entry. 
4.2.2 .l\larket Performance 
Market performance, which are measured by relative market share, of the . new 
entrants in the UK telecommunications service under this study for first five years of entry 
is as follows: 
Table 17: New Entrants' Market Share (%)10 
:..,I, 
COLT Telecommunications Pie. 0.0005 0.0337 0.1278 0.4764 1.0832 
Energis Pie. 0.0641 0.5822 1.2911 n/a n/a 
General Cable Pie. 0.0986 0.4424 1.0-B0 2.1719 2.7988 
Telewest Communications Pie. 0.2325 0.4424 1.0430 2.1719 2.7988 
/onica Pie. 0.0071 0.0068 0.0350 n/a n/a 
Atlantic Telecom Pie. 0.0000 0.0145 n/a n/a n/a 
World Telecom Pie. 0.0018 0.0214 0.0587 0.1201 n/a 
Oranf!..ePlc. 6.3333 6.9510 7.8645 12.0020 14 8237 
Table 18: New Entrants' Market Share Grol\1h (%) 
COLT Telecommunications Pie. 7,56.l 278.7 272.7 127.4 1983.7 
Energis Pie. 808.5 121.8 n/a n/a 465.1 
General Cable Pie. 59.3 34.3 45.0 77.5 54.1 
Telewest Communications Pie. 40.3 135.8 108.2 28.9 90.8 
Ioni~a Pie. 410.9 -5. l 417.2 n/a 274.3 
Atlantic Telecom Pie. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
World Telecom Pie. 1.095.8 173.8 104.5 n/a 458.3 
Oranf!..e Pie. 9.8 13. l 52.6 23.5 29 8 
Table 17 shows that the new entrants holding a very low share. In fact. only one 
new entrant held more than one percent share in the first year of entry, two entrant held 
more than one percent share in the third year of entry, and one entrant had more than one 
percent share in five year of entry. The rest still had no more than one percent share until 
five year of entry. Share improvement, however, for the new entrants as a whole to have 
occurred at a high rate of growth as shown in Table 18. 
20 measured as a perceniage of companie3 turnover to total market turnover after considermg segmenial turnover (type of ser\'lces for cable 
operators and geographical for companies who expand their bus mess outside the UK) 
~~~~~~~-----.;....;...____,; __ 11:ft 
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Working capital/sales figure also varied significantly among the samples. A 
positive figure in working capital/sales means that a new entrant can self-finance - by cash 
generated from sales - for its working capital. On the other hand, a negative figure in 
working capital means that a new entrant has heavily employed non-interest bearing 
liabilities such as trade creditors, and accrued income, to finance their working capital. 
This also suggest that the new entrant failed to generate cash from their sales. Therefore a 
negative working capital is likely to have a high possibility of over-trading and poor 
performance. 
Table 20: Investments & Cash Flow Generated by 8 New Entrants 
for The First Three Yean of Entry 
: : ~ .. ., 
. -··· ~ \;-; .!:~ \ ! :: ~: . .1:· '•\ :1:\ ,I:!. :1 '!..:";.:::::.::. 
~ · .... ~- r· -~· .. t -: ,._.··.~;~ -! !°t ... ::L:_,:·. 
Caeital expenditure/sales 1,126.0 427.4 2,601.2 11.984.4 
Total Assets/sales 1,129.9 735.9 1,576.8 6,290.6 
Working caeital /sales - 256.9 12.4 1,192.0 727.9 
Administration cost/sales 325.1 74.8 1,072.1 5,206.1 
Cash Flow /Investment -98.3 -7.4 142.8 194.9 
Cash Flow/Sales -1,089.8 -360.4 2,635.6 0.3 
Current Asset/Current 180.7 224.1 675.l 1,290.5 
Liabilities 
\: :: . :·· '' . 
JOO 
34.8 
-4,500.0 
21.1 
-879.7 
-12.812.5 
40.2 
The study found a slightly favourable findings in market share performance. 
Despite all new entrants had only a small share compare to incumbent (BT, and Cable 
Wireless), the growth of their market share were tremendous. The average new entrants 
growth for the first three year of entry was more than ten times of industry growth ( see 
Table 6 and Table 20). This result suggest that entry in the telecommunications service 
industry is classified into long-term rather than short-term investment. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look the new entrant performance at least more than five years of entry. 
5.2 Comparison and Determinants of Performance of New Entrant 
Comparing the findings of individual performance of new entrants in this study, we 
found that some companies achieved performance relatively better than others. A half 
sample of companies in this study, as shown in Table 21, had a better performance than 
another half of sample. Most of the relatively better performance companies are cable 
companies (General cable, Telewest Companies, Atlantic Telecom), while the relatively 
lower performance companies are newly created companies (Orange, Colt 
Telecommunications, Energis and World Telecom). Only one newly created company, 
Ionica, had relatively better performance. 
Most of the relatively better performance companies are emphasised on lower 
price, some of them has combined price and quality. On the other hand most of the lower 
performance companies have emphasised on quality and breadth of their products or 
services. 
The findings suggest that there were a significant effect of entry strategy on 
performance came from the type of entrant, magnitude of investment, and competitive 
positioning, while the effect of the timing of entry on performance was varied. 
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A-lagnitude of investment The findings reveal that there was a negative 
relationship between magnitude of investment and performance. The higher a company's 
relative investments the lower the companies performance in the first three years of entry. 
Table 22: Generated Slack Resources of New Entrants for the First Three Years of Entry· 
. . !·:·' •\• c .?,~~ r .... ,. ( :: ~- , .... '.: ' . \ .. 
Atlantic Telecom Pie -45.8 -179.8 239.4 
General Cable Pie -61.2 -494.3 219.5 
Telewest Communications Pie -75.0 -730.5 267.4 
Ionica Pie -77.3 -494.3 533.3 
Orange Pie -78.3 -183.5 63.5 
Colt Telecommunications Pie -109.4 -1,228.7 57.0 
Energis Pie -116.4 -4,548.6 46.2 
World Telecom Pie -205.3 -126.0 39.3 
Table 23: lnYested Slack Resources of New Entrants for the First Three Years of Entry· 
,. •. a; ; ; ~ ~ • .'! ~; ; ~ !... .J ;:: ~: .1 ~ ... : ;i: ,-.. ,:·:. . ::~ .~,:·:. 
i·. ·, :,,. .. ;,·;·. _.;.,,._ :, t :,: ... ;: ,! : ,:· .. 
'·' 
~i.i:::·' 'a·.·\ '--.l,. 
Colt Telecommunications Pie 4,232.6 2,396.6 -1,511.9 1,798.3 
Energis Pie 1,866.7 2,215.5 -1,257.3 246,5 
Telewest Communications Pie 836.8 1,112.0 171.1 79.1 
General Cable Pie 762.5 916.2 90.5 89.6 
Ionica Pie 662.1 1,407.9 815.8 85.6 
Orange Pie 244.4 314.4 -19.1 26.2 
Atlantic Telecom Pie 146.0 326.2 130.4 36.7 
World Telecom Pie 59.3 82.5 -52.7 156.3 
As shown in Table 22 and 23, the companies which have relatively achieved a 
good performance - General Cable, Atlantic Telecom, and Telewest Communications -
invested relatively lower percentage of invested slack - capital expenditure/sales and 
administration cost/sales - and generated relatively higher percentage of generated slack -
cash flow/investment, cash flow/sales, and current assets/current liabilities - than those of 
average of the samples. This result was consistent with previous research on slack 
resources and performance reported by Chakravarty (1986), and Greenley and Oktemgil 
(1998). 
Competitive emphasis The findings have not shown a clear relationship 
between the competitive emphasis and the performance of new entrants. However, there 
was an indication that a new entrant which failed to achieve positional advantage was 
likely to have poor performance. For instance, Energis has emphasised on costs control 
and has deployed the latest technological development by laid its fibre route along the 
National Grid's power infrastructure. In fact, the company failed to achieve costs 
advantage which resulted in the most negative in gross margin/sales figures among other 
entrants. 
Competitive positioning The findings show that competitive positioning had a 
direct effect on the performance of new entrants. The new entrant which compete with 
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have resulted in higher margin than those on long distance (i.e. national and 
international calls) and advanced services portfolio. 
The above result was consistent with previous research that argued that type of 
entrants, magnitude of investments - generated slack and invested slack resources -, and 
competitive positioning are likely to have a significant relationship with the new entrant 
performance, while timing of entry is considered to be a contingent determinant of entry 
success. 
There were some limitations of this study. The number of samples of this study 
was to small to get a good statistical analysis. The number of year of entry was very 
limited which might lead to under-stated the performance of the new entrants. The 
measurement of new entrant performance was also limited by accuracy of accounting 
measure from published account. The qualitative analysis are based on the company's and 
market's published information of the new entrants which might reflect a strategic 
intention of the companies rather than strategic action and implementation. Hence a 
subjective judgement can not be avoided in the analysis. 
It is suggested that further research should be carried out with larger sample and 
longer period of entry, and to use non-accounting measure for performance evaluation 
(market measure PIE ratio, market/book value, and quality of services, etc.) To 
comprehend the analysis, it is also suggested to integrate competitive reaction of entry by 
incumbents into the entry strategy and performance model. 
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